Process-related factors associated with disciplinary board decisions by Søren Birkeland et al.
Birkeland et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13:9
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/9RESEARCH ARTICLE Open AccessProcess-related factors associated with disciplinary
board decisions
Søren Birkeland1*, Rene dePont Christensen1, Niels Damsbo1 and Jakob Kragstrup1,2Abstract
Background: In most health care systems disciplinary boards have been organised in order to process patients’
complaints about health professionals. Although, the safe-guarding of the legal rights of the involved parties is a
crucial concern, there is limited knowledge about what role the complaint process plays with regard to board
decision outcomes. Using complaint cases towards general practitioners, the aim of this study was to identify what
process factors are statistically associated with disciplinary actions as seen from the party of the complainant and
the defendant general practitioner, respectively.
Methods: Danish Patient Complaints Board decisions concerning general practitioners completed in 2007 were
examined. Information on process factors was extracted from the case files and included complaint delay, complainant’s
lawyer involvement, the number of general practitioners involved, event duration, expert witness involvement, case
management duration and decision outcome (discipline or no discipline). Multiple logistic regression analyses were
performed on compound case decisions eventually involving more general practitioners (as seen from the
complainant’s side) and on separated decisions (as seen from the defendant general practitioner’s side).
Results: From the general practitioner’s side, when the number of general practitioners involved in a complaint case
increased, odds of being disciplined significantly decreased (OR=0.661 per additional general practitioner involved,
p<0.001). Contrarily, from the complainant’s side, no association could be detected between complaining against a
plurality of general practitioners and the odds of at least one general practitioner being disciplined. From both sides,
longer case management duration was associated with higher odds of discipline (OR=1.038 per additional month,
p=0.010). No association could be demonstrated with regard to complaint delay, lawyer involvement, event duration, or
expert witness involvement. There was lawyer involvement in 5% of cases and expert witness involvement in 92% of cases. The
mean complaint delay was 3 months and 18 days and the mean case management duration was 14 months and 7 days.
Conclusions: Certain complaint process factors might be statistically associated with decision outcomes. However, the
impact diverges as seen from the different parties. Future studies are merited in order to uncover the judicial mechanisms
lying behind.
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In most countries, a disciplinary system handles complaints
from patients concerning health professionals, including
general practitioners (GPs). The disciplinary systems have
the difficult task of weighing a variety of considerations
when making decisions in concrete complaint cases. These
considerations include strict health professional considera-
tions (concerning the health care actually delivered), but* Correspondence: sbirkeland@health.sdu.dk
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reproduction in any medium, provided the oralso patient safety interests and professional ethics. The
structure of disciplinary systems reflects the judicial safe-
guarding of these balancing interests. In this regard, the
legal rights of the complainants and the involved health
professionals persistently play a predominant role. The
European Convention on Human Rights states a number
of such legal rights (Article 6) including, e.g., tribunal im-
partiality, the right to be heard and within reasonable time,
and the right to legal assistance. Member states of the
Council of Europe, like Denmark, are party to the Conven-
tion and are obliged to address the protection of fair trials.al Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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plaints about the professional conduct of named health care
professionals who are authorised by the Danish National
Board of Health. The board is separated from the compen-
sation system and patients only seeking monetary compen-
sation are redirected to the Danish National Health
Insurance Association (“Patientforsikringen”). Complaints
about the level of service (e.g. unsatisfactory waiting times)
are sent to the regional health authority. Furthermore, by
the introduction of an additional “Patientombuddet” insti-
tution, recent revisions of the Danish system aim at enhan-
cing the possibilities of complaining about courses of health
care rather than about named health professionals. As it
appears, the complaint system is multifaceted. Therefore,
local public advice and complaints advocacy service offices
have been established in order to guide people wishing to
make a complaint through the different systems and help is
given to forward complaints to the right authority.
In January 2011, the board handling complaints about
professional conduct was renamed “the Danish Discip-
linary Board” (from “The Danish Patient Complaints
Board”, DPCB), and some organisational changes were
implemented. For the most part the case management
procedure is, however, unaltered. The procedure is as
follows: After receiving a complaint from the patient
concerned or his/her relatives about one or more named
health professionals the case is clarified by the secretar-
iat. In this regard, a hearing takes place and the health
professional is asked to provide a statement in response
to the complaint. Subsequently, the secretariat makes a
proposal for a decision. Typically, in those cases not only
concerning patients’ formal legal rights, the proposal is
based upon evaluations made by the board’s expert wit-
nesses. For instance, complaints against GPs are assessed
by GP experts. The board’s decision is made by a five-
person committee headed by a chairperson who is a
judge. The main disciplinary remedy is a discipline
expressed through means of issuing either “criticism” or
– until 1 January 2011 – the mildest reaction “dispute of
professional conduct”. The latter measures imply that
the health professional(s) involved, the complainant, and
other relevant partakers receive the board’s disapproba-
tion of the health professional by letter. In case of repeti-
tion, a criticism may result in public announcement of
the health professional’s name, and – in a few cases –
withdrawal of the health professional’s authorisation to
practice. Other possible, but rare, sanctions comprise is-
suing a discipline with injunction, or bringing the health
professional concerned for the prosecuting authority. In
2007, the DPCB made 2387 decisions and approximately
one fifth concerned treatments in general practice [1].
The disciplinary system has been under an ongoing re-
vision in order to optimise the judicial process. The judi-
cial interests of the parties have been safeguarded byregulations in relation to different process factors (i.e.
procedural issues from the medical event concerned
until complaint decision). Such process factors consid-
ered of importance to the parties include for example
expert witness involvement and time limits for com-
plaining. It has been continuously debated whether the
complaint system pays enough attention to the involved
parties’ legal rights. In this respect, there are two major
angles: the side of the complainant party, who complains
about one or more health professionals, and that of the
individual health professional who receives a complaint.
Presumably complainants seek to improve their com-
plaints’ possibilities of being declared justified (thereby
disciplining health care staff ) when engaging a lawyer.
Likewise, a priori, if the period of time to be assessed is
extended, or more health professionals are complained
about, the likelihood of identifying some health profes-
sional negligence resulting in discipline would possibly
increase. This would favour the complainants. Contrar-
ily, it may be hypothesised that due to for example in-
creasing difficulties with satisfying the burden of proof,
delayed complaints are less prone to be declared justi-
fied. Likewise, it has been claimed that sanctions are less
likely if the case is assessed by a peer expert witness [2].
Anyhow, we have limited empirical knowledge as to
what extent such process factors are on the whole
related to the likelihood of cases resulting in discipline.
Reasonable development of the quality and efficiency of
patient complaint structures requires such knowledge to
inform the legislators and organisers about what really
matters during the patient complaint process. Using
decisions against Danish GPs, the objective of this study
was to investigate what process factors are statistically
associated with decisions on discipline as seen from the
sides of both the complainant party and the defendant
(GP) party.
Methods
Study database and population
This study is a part of a larger register-based study con-
cerning disciplinary board decisions towards Danish GPs
in 2007. In this cohort study, the board decisions were
analysed with regard to a number of process factors in
order to compare decisions on discipline (“criticism” or
“dispute of professional conduct”) with those not result-
ing in discipline.
Data collection
Paper files related to all DPCB decisions in 2007 con-
cerning general practice were reviewed. Decisions were
treated both as compound decisions (in some cases in-
volving more GPs) and as separate decisions against in-
dividual GPs. In a compound decision some GPs might
be disciplined and others might not.
Table 1 Process factors and outcomes in compound
complaint decisions (n=427)
Case process factor [Range]
Complaint delay, mean 3 months,
18 days
1 day – 47 months,
5 days










2 months, 3 days – 72
months, 5 days
Expert witness involvement 393 (92%)
Decision outcome
Discipline * 114 (27%)
(*) one or more GPs disciplined (criticism or professional conduct disputed,
see text).
Table 2 Process factors associated with being disciplined
as a general practitioner (n=571)
Discipline OR P 95% Confidence
intervals
Complaint initiation
Complaint delay (months) 0.988 0.521 0.954-1.024
Lawyer involvement No 1
Yes 1.257 0.633 0.491-3.216
Complaint demarcation
General practitioners involved 0.661 0.000 0.524-0.835





Expert witness involvement No 1
Yes 1.366 0.452 0.606-3.077
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delay (time from the medical event concerned until filing
the complaint), lawyer involvement by the complainant (ju-
dicial expertise used to e.g. formulate the complaint), the
number of general practitioners involved, and the event
duration concerned (duration of health care episode). With
regard to Complaint delay, for practical reasons the time
interval from the last date of the health care event until
registration within the disciplinary board was used. Obvi-
ously this time comes after the time of complaining. The
date of registration was, however, considered useful because
it was unfailingly available in every case and is most prob-
ably closely tied with the time of producing the complaint.
The involvement of an expert witness and case management
duration (from the date of registration of the complaint
within the disciplinary board until the date of decision)
were included as independent variables. Finally, information
was gathered on decision outcome (dichotomised into “dis-
cipline” or “no discipline”).
Analyses
Factors associated with discipline were identified by means
of a multiple logistic regression model. The dependent
variable in the model distinguished decisions on discipline
from decisions without discipline. Odds ratios (ORs) for
cases resulting in discipline with regard to the characteris-
tics (independent variables) mentioned above were esti-
mated. First, the unit used for the statistical analysis was
compound decisions relating to the entire complaint filed
by the complainant and sometimes including separate
decisions about more GPs. In this connection outcome
was considered as a “discipline” if at least one of the
involved GPs had been disciplined; this corresponds to the
notion of a complaint being declared ‘justified’. In the sec-
ond statistical analysis, the unit used was decisions about
separate GPs (as seen from the individual GP’s side) again
dichotomised into discipline or no discipline. When ana-
lysing the separate decisions, clustering at the case level
was taken into account by robust estimation. P-values <
0.05 were considered statistically significant. The analyses
were undertaken using STATAW, release 11.1.
Ethical approval
This study was approved by the DPCB and the Danish Data
Protection Agency (Licence: 2008-41-2875). In Denmark,
registry-based studies do not by law require ethical
approval from the local research ethics committee.
Results
In 2007, 427 compound decisions were made concerning
general practice. Sample characteristics are outlined in
Table 1.
Most cases (n=338, 79%) only involved one GP. In 55
cases (13%), the number of general practitioners involvedwas two. In 18 cases (4%) 3 GPs were involved, and in
the remaining 16 cases (4%) 4 GPs were involved. In
45 cases (11%) one or more non-GPs were involved,
most frequently hospital doctors, non hospital specia-
lists (e.g. ear, nose, and throat specialists), and nurses.
The compound decisions concerned 571 separate deci-
sions relating to individual GPs. The association between
individual GPs being disciplined and process factors is
shown in Table 2.
When the number of general practitioners involved in
a complaint case increased, the odds of discipline
decreased for the individual GP concerned (OR=0.661
per additional GP involved, p<0.001). Conversely, when
analysing the association between process factors and
discipline in compound decisions (from the side of the
complainant party, table not shown), no statistical asso-
ciation could be detected between the number of general
practitioners involved and odds of the compound deci-
sion resulting in at least one of the litigated GPs being
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ment duration was associated with increased odds of dis-
cipline. Hence, a six-month prolonged case management
duration was associated with 26% increased odds of the
case resulting in a decision on discipline (p=0.010, 28%
in compound decisions, p=0.011). No association could
be demonstrated with regard to event duration, com-
plaint delay, expert witness involvement, or complainant’s
lawyer involvement. Even when taking clustering into ac-
count in separate decisions, the association between deci-
sion outcome and number of general practitioners involved
and case management duration, respectively, was statisti-
cally significant.
Discussion
The key findings of this study are an association between
a rising number of general practitioners involved and
decreased odds of being disciplined as an individual GP
and between longer case management duration and
increased odds of discipline.
The present study covers all Danish complaint cases
involving GPs completed during one year and is based
on register data and case management files, which are
likely to be complete and reliable. It should be kept in
mind that, despite the inclusion of nation-wide data,
only a limited number of cases involving a lawyer came
up and this has a deflating impact on statistical power.
The deflation of statistical power may also be of import-
ance regarding the use of expert witnesses, because very
few decisions were made without an expert witness.
Furthermore, when comparing with the situation in
other countries it should be kept in mind that the mater-
ial only concerns complaints about the GP’s professional
conduct. As mentioned above, complaints only seeking
compensation or complaints about the level of service
are not dealt with.
With the increased complexity of health care, risks are
not only limited to the performance issues but may also
relate to issues regarding, e.g., coordination and commu-
nication. Therefore, a parallel system has been estab-
lished, where complainants may file a complaint to the
“Patientombuddet” with regard to concrete health care
without intending named health professionals to be dis-
ciplined. In those cases, it may be concluded that the
health care provided as such was criticisable. The com-
plainant may subsequently file a complaint to the discip-
linary board against those named health care providers
involved, in order to clarify if any named health profes-
sionals should receive a disciplinary sanction as well.
Only limited comparable literature exists concerning the
proportion of patient complaints leading to a sanction.
However, the present findings that 27% of cases results in
a disciplinary action seems reasonably in agreement with
previous recordings from the Netherlands that, during a20-year period, roughly one fifth of complaint cases was
declared justified [3].
Likewise, the association between health disciplinary
process factors and decision outcomes has attracted little
research attention. The only study existing on the rela-
tion of process factors to decision outcomes is a Japa-
nese analysis of medical malpractice case decisions [4].
As in the present study, lengthy cases were shown to be
associated with decisions in the patients’ favour. The
causes of this association might be numerous, but the
most likely reason might be that straightforward (short-
duration) cases are typically those with limited likelihood
of negligence, while the cases resulting in discipline may
be more complicated, generally requiring a thorough
(long-lasting) case management.
Prolonged case management is demanding for all the
involved parties in disciplinary proceedings – not least
the defendant. Although (repeated) hearings aim to safe-
guard legal right requirements (see above), case pro-
longation may be a hardly avoidable drawback. Still, case
management should agree with for example the reason-
able time requirement according to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, Article 6. In this regard, it is
noticeable that the increased odds of disciplining the de-
fendant with case management prolongation run parallel
to case durations up to 6 years.
It has previously been argued that the involvement of
lawyers on behalf of patients may increase the possibility
that breaches of standards of practice are clarified, because
lawyers to a higher extent bring forth written protocols
and standards [5]. However, the present study could not
verify any statistical association with decision outcome.
One major reason may simply be a lack of statistical
power. Nevertheless, lawyers may perhaps only be able to
contribute little to the examination of complaint cases. As
mentioned above, the disciplinary board has a duty to in-
dependently examine the case and maybe therefore a legal
representative was involved in no more than one out of
twenty complaint cases. Hagihara et al. [4] suggested that
only few lawyers have sufficient experience in medical
malpractice litigation, and not least in Denmark there is
little tradition among lawyers to concentrate their business
on health professional disciplinary proceedings.
Even though international guidelines have been issued
to ensure expert witness impartiality [6,7], Lens and van
der Wal have highlighted the possible mechanism
among health professionals of covering up dysfunction
in a so-called “conspiracy of silence” [2]. Correspond-
ingly, a Dutch study recently demonstrated that more
than one third of “Healthcare Consumer Panel” mem-
bers had no confidence in the disciplinary proceedings
and their independent status [8]. Another Dutch study
showed, however, a decreased proportion of complaint
cases resulting in discipline after including more lawyers
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[9]. Fellow expert witnesses are not appointed in order to
cover their colleagues and, from a statistical point of view,
do not appear to do so. The present study could not docu-
ment any statistically significant association between fel-
low professional involvement and the odds of discipline.
Anyhow, the disciplinary board’s preparation of the case
is highly dependent on the initial demarcation of the
complaint case provided by the complainant. From the
complainant’s point of view, no association could be
demonstrated between involving a larger group of GPs in
the complaint and the odds of disciplining at least one GP.
Some would interpret this finding to be satisfactory; the
opposite result could suggest an unwarranted element of
fault finding. Though, from the point of view of the GP
concerned, the demarcation of the number of general prac-
titioners involved, contrary to the demarcation with regard
to event duration and complaint delay, was not only trivial.
Hence, the study suggests that being involved together with
other GPs protects against discipline. In other words, the
instinctive sense of relief if realising being litigated in plur-
ality might be substantiated in a statistical counterpart.
The mechanisms might be numerous. Complaints against
more health professionals might sometimes indicate ‘shoot-
ing from the hip’ or hardly transparent system matters. In
this regard, the above-mentioned new “Patientombuddet”
institution should be mentioned as it allows for less specif-
ically outlined complaints to be handled (e.g. without refer-
ence to named health professionals). It is, however, crucial
that the analyses do not take into account the content of
the complaint material and hence lack the data necessary
to further inform about the basis of the statistical findings.
Conclusions
The analyses of the present article offer insight into some
statistical associations between complaint cases resulting in
discipline against health professionals and a number of
measurable process factors. The impact of the process fac-
tors, however, diverged as seen by the complainant party
and the defendant party, respectively. Statistically significant
associations only existed between being litigated in plurality
and decreased odds of discipline, and between prolonged
case management and increased odds of discipline.
Optimal complaint case management is an important
goal, because complaint cases are very resource-demanding
for the involved parties. Statistical analyses on disciplinary
process factors might offer valuable information on issues
of key judicial impact. For instance, the apparently different
odds of being disciplined when litigated alone and jointly,
respectively, raise concerns about whether these categories
should be offered a differentiated means of legal advice
when navigating the complaint process. Likewise, the asso-
ciation between decision outcomes and process prolonga-
tion might necessitate the introduction of specified andintensified process measures when reasonable time require-
ments are endangered.
Given the high financial and human costs associated
with the complaint case process, future studies concern-
ing the judicial mechanisms lying behind the suggested
associations are needed in order to optimise the hand-
ling of complaint cases, simultaneously preserving the
involved parties’ legal rights.
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